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TORTS - LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE
AS HUMANITARIAN ROLE
The plaintiff, a pedestrian, was struck from the rear by de-
fendant's automobile while walking on the right side of the hard
surface of the road with her back to oncoming traffic in violatioa
of a statute., The accident occurred just after dawn on a winter
morning while visibility was very poor. Defendant had wiped some
frost from his windshield but the areas cleaned were not sufficiently
large or clear to afford good vision. The plaintiff did not hear
or see the defendant approach and when the defendant finally saw
the plaintiff it was too late to avoid the accident. Plaintiff ad-
mitted her negligence in walking on the wrong side of the road
but insisted that the defendant in the exercise of ordinary care,
should have seen her in time to avoid striking her and that therefore
the doctrine of last clear chance was applicable. The trial court
awarded damages to the plaintiff. On appeal, held, reversed. The
continuing negligence of the plaintiff in being in a position of un-
conscious peril was a proximate, not a remote, cause of the accident.
Anderson v. Payne, 189 Va. 712, 54 S. E. 2d 82 (1949). Hudgins,
C. J. and Miller, Sprattley, JJ. concurring.
Vhile many of the cases in Virginia on the last clear chance
doctrine appear to be irreconcilable,2 the general rule in this state
seems to be that the doctrine is to be applied when the plaintiff is
in peril as a result of his antecedent negligence and the defendant
discovers, or, with proper vigilance, might have discovered the plain-
tiff's peril in time to avoid it.3 As Chief Justice Holt said in
Maryland v. Coard,4 "he is charged with what he saw and what
he should have seen." The Supreme Court of Appeals has recog-
nized several limitations to this interpretation of last clear chance
in that the doctrine will not be allowed to wipe out or supercede
the doctrine of contributory negligence.5 Where the last clear
chance is mutual, or if the plaintiff has an equal or better chance
than the defendant to avoid the accident, the plaintiff cannot
recover.6 The plaintiff may not demand greater care for his own
protection than he himself exercises. All but a few jurisdictions
hold that there can be no recovery.7
It is essential to note at this point that the entire court agreed
that there was no liability on the part of the defendant. It is the
method of reaching that result which splits the court. The major-
ity of the court continues to apply the "humanitarian rule," making
the defendant liable for all he saw or should have seen. However
it conditions its application of the rule by seizing on the fact that
at no time was the plaintiff helpless to avoid the harm resulting
from her antecedent negligence. She had an equal chance to avoid
the accident so her continuing negligence must be held to have been
a proximate cause of the injury. At no time, however, does the
court relieve the defendant of the responsibility for what he saw or
should have seen.
It is on this point that the three judge concurring opinion
differs from the majority, maintaining that the plaintiff should be
entitled to recover only by proving by the preponderance of the
evidences that the defendant knew of her presence and realized or
should have realized her inattentiveness and peril and then failed to
use reasonable care to avoid the collision.9 It is submitted that
this view held by the concurring judges is the more sound, will lead
to less confusion, and is in line with the weight of authority in this
country.
The doctrine of last clear chance is used to modify the harsh-
ness of the law of contributory negligence but it is not to be used
to supercede such defense.o Consequently in most jurisdictions.
last clear chance is applied and limited to two separate classes of
plaintiffs. Recovery is allowed where plaintiff is in a helpless
position due to his antecedent negligence and defendant saw or should
have seen him in time to avoid the accident by the use of reasonable
care. Where the plaintiff through his own negligence or inatten-
tiveness is in a position of peril but at all times can remove himself
from such peril, he can recover only by proving that defendant,
after seeing him, realized, or should have realized his peril and was
then negligent in attempting to avoid the accident."x Mr. Justice
Miller in a recent concurring opinionT2 quoted favorably from
American Jurisprudence as follows: "The great weight of judicial
authority denies the application of the last clear chance doctrine in
the situation where the defendant, while under a duty to discover
the danger to the injured person, did not actually discover it and
the injured person was physically able to escape from the peril at
any time up to the moment of impact."3
This line of demarcation was recognized in Virginia as long
ago as 189014 but the court has failed to follow it and thus has
brought on much confusion. By insisting that the defendant be
responsible for all that he sees or should see but deciding cases on
the basis of continuing mutuality of negligence, the court in effect
adopts a rule of comparative negligence. Each case is necessarily
decided by determining who contributed most to the accident in
spite of the mandate given some years ago that the doctrine of last
clear chance is not to become in fact a rule of comparative negli-
gencex5 - a rule almost entirely abandoned at common law because
of its difficulty of application by sympathetic jurors.x6
In the instant case it is true that had the defendant properly
defrosted his windshield he would have seen the plaintiff in time to
have avoided the accident but to do this is to draw a distinction
between negligently failing to see and negligently making it im-
possible to see. Had the defendant seen plaintiff in ample time and
been unable to stop due to negligently defective brakes, it is submitted
that defendant would have been held not liable under either view
of the Virginia court.'7 Negligent inability to have the last clear
chance is not the same as having it.
By a strict application of the general rule of the majority in the
instant case, one might infer that a pedestrian does not owe the
same duty to look out for a car as the driver of the car owes to look
out for the pedestrian. When the pedestrian is in his proper place
this is good law, but when that pedestrian deliberately places him-
self in a position of peril from which he may remove himself at
any time, then he is negligentx8 and owes the same duty to the
driver as is owed to him. It is submitted that the "humanitarian
rule" of the majority of the court requires the defendant to exercise
a greater degree of care for the plaintiff than the plaintiff is re-
quired to exercise for himself.
In the closing paragraph the court submits a hypothetical prob-
lem whereby healthy but negligent plaintiff A is carrying helpless
plaintiff B and both are struck by a motorist who negligently did
not see them. The court infers that to allow helpless plaintiff B
to recover because he ought to have been seen and not to allow A
to recover because he is healthy and could have removed himself
from peril, is at least an unjust, if not a ridiculous result. It is
submitted that the result would not be unjust in that it is in
keeping with our concept of law that a greater duty and protection
is owed to some classes than others. The beating of an invalid with
the fists may well constitute an intent to kill and amount to a
felony,19 while the same act done to a healthy man of equal size
is a mere misdemeanor.
It is further submitted that the continued application of this
broad last clear chance doctrine as announced by the majority of
the court, coupled with its varying limiting facts, leads only to
hopeless confusion, while the Restatement view as expressed by the
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